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HISTORICISM: SOME THOUGHTS ON LIFE-WORLD 
More than three decades. ago, Walter Biemel read a paper at the 
Third Colloquium of Philo·sophy at Royaumont on "The Decisive Phases 
in the Developtnent of Husserl's Philosophy'' that seemed to be 
definitive.1 Notwithstanding the great value of the facts and reflections 
that he provided, and the numerous studies devoted. afterwards to the 
same problem1 it is not easy to fix diffet·ent stages_ in Husserl's work. 
This difficulty is increased by the lack of a strict synchrony between 
the works that Husserl himself published and those that remained unpub-
lished after his death and have been laboriously recove,red by his 
disciples. Actually, in manuscripts belonging to early moments in his life 
we find theories which would appear i11 1nuch later publicatio11s. T.hus, 
the proble1ns concerning· subjectivity. focusing on the study of the ''living 
soma'' (der Leib) a11d its kinesthetic experiences~ and the kno·wledge 
of the "alter ego" by means of "empathy,, (die .Einfühlu.ng), that ·were 
made public in the Cartesian Meditations in 1931, are outlined in his 
lectures on The Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology of the Winter 
Semestet of 1910-11. 
This might make us think that Husserl's thought de~eloped continu-
ously, without any sudden changes in íts successive stages. However, I 
am goi11g to suggest the possibility that the problem of history was the 
cause of an importan.t turn in Husserl' s thought, and that, together with 
it, many· other subjects underwent perce¡Jtible changes in his work. In 
particular, the concept of ''world'', conceived as ''surrounding world" 
(Umwelt) in the first-part of the Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology, becatne 
' 
the "concrete life-world'' in the fjfth of the Cartesian Meditations and 
in The Crisis of European Sciences. And it is from this ''world'~ that, 
as a result of the phenomenological investigation, tbe ''original life-
world" of Experience and Judgment and the "primordial world'' also 
studied in the Fifth Cartesian Meditation are both derived. That is to 
say, they are ~'wo.rlds'' that have to be reach.ed by the phenomenolog-
ical reduction starting from the "concrete lífe-wo.rlds" penetrated by 
the sediments of history. In this paper 1 will try· to d·etermine their 
fundamental stru.ctures, insofar as the products of history elaborated by 
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the activity of the human subject are deposited in tl1e1n, and inasmuch 
as they stem from investigations that have started from ''worlds" his-
torically constituted. 
But it is also proper to ask to what extent a positive assessment of 
the historícal implied a modification in the scope that the a priori had 
far Hu.sserl, since it is well known that historicism, together with 
psychologism, wete the objects of Husserl's attacks in Philosophy as 
Rigorous Science in 1911, insofar as they both rejected the validity of 
logical principles that had an a priori value. Th·at is to say, a priori 
had always meant for Husserl ''universal and necessary validity'', And 
that 1iecessity of whicb a priori is valid as a rational ground for any 
objectivity also means its universal validity for any fo.rm of conscious-
ness. lt is inconceivable, for example, that tt1ere are people who sp.eak 
about things witbout displaying forms of consciousrtess that unify their· 
various appearances as aspects of the same object; people who do not 
perform processes of .identification by which the sameness of what is 
in any case an o~ject is constituted, thus obeying the requirements of 
the principie of identity. 
That means that an aprioristic interpretation of consciousness or of its 
intentional objects implies a certain historical compromise or, at least, 
it favours an interpretation of history that, no matter what its eventful 
course was, would l1ave to respect the a priori app·licability of the 
ontological principles and the essential structures that have validity in 
consciousness and in its objective world. 
lt is, therefore, understandable that Husserl rejected Dilthey' s his ... 
toricism in Philosophy as Rigo1·01us Science, since - Husserl quotes 
Dilthey's own words 
The formation of a historical consciousness destroys more thotoughly than does surveying 
the disagreement of systems a belief in the universal validity of any of the philosophies 
that have undertaken to express in a compelling mann·er the col1erence of the world by 
an ensemble of concept.. 2 
That is, Husserl adds a few lines later, ''historicism, if consistently ca1ried 
through, carries over in to extreme sceptical subjecti vism''. In fact,, ''the 
'idea' of science [ ... ] is a st1pr1atemporal one, and here that means 
limited by no relatedness to the spirit of one time. [ . . . ] Science is a 
title standing for absolute, timeless values. Every such value, once 
discovered, belongs thereafter to the treasu.re trove of all succeeding 
humanity and obviously determines likewise the material content of the 
THOUGtITS ON LIFE·WORLD 259 
idea of culture, wisdom, Weltanschauung, as well as of Weltansc·hauung 
philosophy''.3 World-conceptions can be different and antagonistic; they 
can shape the image of the world in the most various ways according 
to the beliefs and values that predominate ln them. ''Weltanschauungen 
can engag.e in controversy;. only science can decide, an·d its decision bears 
the stamp of eternity''.4 
In hís Introduction to the corresp.ondence exchanged between Dilthey 
and Husserl on the occasion of Husserl's challenge to historicistn in 
Philosophy as Rigorous Science, Walter Biemel lucidly summarizes the 
lcey to their antagonism: 
The opposition between Dilthey and Husserl's conceptions of the essence of philosophy 
líes in their different attitudes toward history. While for Dilthey, history is essentially 
the place in which the spjrit develops, in which it actualizes its self-understanding,· for 
tlusserl, in this period, history is rather the place .in which the idea only obscurely comes 
io appearance, and therefore must be purified throu·gh the seeing of essences, which 
abstracts from everything that is historically factual. 5 
One .must admit, in f act, that 11p to 1931, the ye ar when the Cartesian 
Meditations w,ere published, history is absent from the scene of Husserl's 
phenomenology. Only the first part of First Philosophy - the manu-
script of which belongs to the Wmter Semester of 1923-24 - shows a 
serious concern for the history of philoso.phical thought, b·ut, strictly 
speaking., the problem of history in a broad .sense is ·not considered. Now; 
that absence of history is due not only to the f act that phenomenology 
culn1inates in the intuition of the essences that rule a priori the 
functions of .consciousness or the constitution of the corresponding 
objectivities; it also depends on the fact that, in the panorama of the 
situations that were the ''starting point'' for the phenomenological 
investigation an.d that constituted a world, the historicity that might be 
granted to that worldly spectacle was o.f little consequence. The formal 
logic that is developed in the Logical lnvestigations and that has as its 
central subject the statement and tbe analytical principies which govern 
it, ass.umed that its own structure is invariable througho·ut history. From 
the point of view of the logic of statement, the world is hardly mentioned 
in relation to the legitimacy (Vertriiglichkeit) of judgments, on which 
no historical accident can inake an impression: "It is absurd to doubt 
whether the actual course of the world, the actual connectio.n of the world, 
can conflict with the forms of thought'', Husserl says in bis Sixth Logical 
Investigation.6 
It might be expected that the sitt1atio.n should change in the Ideas 
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for a Pure Phenomenology, since that work deals more extensively with 
the problem of the ''surtounding wot·1d'' (die Umwelt) as a "starting point'' 
of the phenomenological investigation given in the "natural attitude''. 
And it is evident that the consideration of the world - as the universe 
of objects, the correlate of the actual and potential totality of the 
activities of consciousness - should facilitate the possibility of paying 
attention to. its historical course. Actually., for Huss·erl ·worldliness means 
fundamentally the totality of the .experiences that flow within the .temporal 
and spatial horizons. it1 which any event occurs. However, the pheno-
menology of. Husserl, in the moment when ít is developed as a 
transcendental logic in the Ideas, still disrega.rds the historicity that might 
affect its ''starting point'', the s·urrounding world that is the ground on 
which to build any investigation about the functio.ns of s1lbJe.ctivity th~it 
ca11 institute the objective situations that fill tl1at world. 
Therefore, in the period between 1900 and 1931, in which the Ideas 
for a Pure Phenomenology were published (1913), history is absent 
from Husserl's problems - except for his attack on historicism .. An.d 
tl1at is so not 011ly because bis ·m·ethodology was oriented towards the 
finding of essences with a11 a priori validity, beyond any temporal or 
historical contingency, but also because the historical dimensio11 that 
the state of affairs filling the surrounding world might have, had been 
suppressed from it. Attentive to the epistemological problems in their 
strictly logical aspect, Husserl thought that 11e could .take as tl1e "starting 
point''' or ''leading thread" of his inquiries a su1·rounding world in wl1icl1 
the only thing that counted was the spatio-temporal character of expe-
riences, as if it were an empirical fieJd not affected by l1istorical 
vicissitudes, not even by th.e theoretical constructions, either scientific 
or cultural, tl1at have risen ·on it and have changed throughout history, 
That is to say, the surrounding world that opens thus to the phenome-
nological investigations forms a subsoil on which the historical cultural 
constructions rise, and, in its own constitution as such a subsoil, only 
consists of the experiences a11d the temporal and spatial horizons 
that are supp,o"sed to be it1diff erent to the variation in the cultural 
f ormations that they suppo"rt. 
The situation undergoes a profound change when tl1e Cartesian 
Meditations, and tnore extensively The Crisis of European Sciences, 
introduce the problem of the concrete life-world .as a substitute for the 
surrounding world of the Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology. Now we 
are dealing with a world that ·becomes prese.nt in hu1nan life in the 
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concrete forms of the various ct1ltural creations that have p.ara·ded 
throughout history. Therefore, the concretion attributed to the new life~ 
world assumes the historical character of its components. Strictly 
speaking, the surrounding world of the Ideas could not be a real ''starting 
point'' for the phenomenological investigation: it was an abstract world 
fro1n which the true concretion of things had been eli1ninated, since it 
had been considered only as a spatio-temporal frame filled with vague 
• exper1ences. 
It is then important to notice that the concrete life--world is fo1·med 
by the objective situations embodied in the most relevant historical 
products that have developed in previous times or in the present. It is 
the world of those things we deal with in our daily lives, which embody 
those interpretations of the1nselves that have been forged by the histor-
ical moment in which we live or by the former times whose achievements 
still prevail. In our concrete life~world we find a Sun that has represented 
the center of the .Earth' s orbit for five. centuries; vehicles that were 
invented not much sooner than th1e beginning of the century now coming 
to an end, and temples that are the testimony of religi.ous beliefs that were 
born in certain tnoments of histo.ry. Moreover, it is formed by a matter 
constituted by atoms, according to physical theories that, since their 
naive beginnings in Ancient Greece, have finally prevailed in the last 
centt1ríes. 
Therefore, the concrete life .. world does not now only consist of 
experiences that are the substratum of the presence of corporeal things, 
nor is it framed by a space anda time merely formal: its concretion means 
that it is f orn1ed by corporeal things ca1Tyi11g all the cultural eleme.nts 
that have been deposited in them and have decided their meaning., that 
meaning which allows us to understand and use them. In other words, 
the concrete life,.world always belo·ngs to a certain cultural environ-
ment- that of the s.ubjects who live it in a determined historical tnoment. 
It is in this way that it can be the "starting point'' f or the phenomeno-
logical investigation, which will h.ave to inquire into the consciousness 
activities that have constituted its objectivity and also to record the 
different levels of its constitution: from the elementary experiences that 
decide tl1e presence of material things, to the more complex functions 
of reason that determine the scie·ntific objectivity and the applicability 
of the ethical, religious and aesthetic values that shape things and turn 
them into "goods;' for tl1ose different forros of conduct. 
In the Fifth C·artesia11 Meditation, Husserl already poses the problem 
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of the concrete life-world in these terms. In § 43 he says that "there · 
belong to the world [ ... ] objects with spiritual predicates that, according 
to their origin and. meaning, refer to subjects and, in general, to extra-
neous subjects and to their active con·stituting intentionality. Such is 
the case of all cultural objects (books, instruments, all kind of works, 
etc.) that, at the same time, enclose the mea.ning of the experience of 
what is .. there-fo·r-everyone''.8 Further on, in § 58, he insists that th.e 
concrete llfe-world belo11gs to the .different human communities that 
live it, since the fact that this world can be the same for all humanity, 
i.e., that we live it as sl1ared by all human beings ''does not exclude, 
nor a priori nor factic.ally, that men of one and the same· world can live 
in an isolated cultural community, or even without one, and that, accord-
ingly, they constitute different surrounding worlds as concrete life-worlds 
(als lconkrete Lebenswelten) in which communities, both in an active 
and a passive way, live relatively or absolutely isolated. Every man u11der-
stands, in the first place, bis concrete surrounding world, that is, his 
culture, in its nucleus and with a horizon still undiscovered, and he 
do.es it precisely as a man of a community that shapes that culture 
historically. Every member of that community can reach, in principle, 
a more profound understanding, an understanding that will open the 
horizon of the past, which is co-determinant for the understanding of 
the present itself; and he <loes so with an originality that is pos si ble for 
him only, and that is not allowe.d to a man of another community that 
comes in contact with the first one". 9 
1 wish to emphasize that in the above lines of the Cartesian 
Meditations, a reference is made to a ''plurality'' and a "diversity'' of 
the concrete life-worlds belonging to different cultural communities .. This 
is an aspect of the concrete lifewworld that is not dealt with in the Crisis 
with the same emphasis. But in this latter work, as well as in the 
lotroduction to Experience and Judgment, he insists that the concrete 
life-world is constituted not only by the level of the elementary experi-
ences that we have of things - wl1ich in Experience and Judgment h.e. 
called the original life-world - but also by the cultural ''sediments" 
(Niederschlage) that have been deposited in them and that carry with 
them ideals leading to a telos that must domínate in the history of 
humanity. lt is interesting to consider, for example, that § 34-e of the 
Crisis is entitled ''The objective sciences as subjecti ve constructs 
(Ge.bilde) - those of a particular praxis, namely, the theoretical-logical, 
which itself belongs to the full concreteness of the life-world''. Indeed, 
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theories are not things, like stone.st houses or trees. ''They are logic·al 
"wholes. · [ ... ] But this or any other identity does not change in the 
Jeast the fact that the·se are human formations,. e·ssentially related to 
human actualíties and potentialities1 and thus belong to this concrete· unity 
of the life .. world (zu dieser konkreten E.i'nheit der Lebenswelt ge·harig), 
whose concreteness thus extends farther tha·n that of 'things' '' .10 That 
persistence in our concrete life-world of the id·eas created by Greek 
philos·ophy and of tbe ideals that lead our existence towards a full t·atio· .. 
nality is precisely one of the most .sedu·cing asp:ects of· The· Crisis of 
European Sciences; it is what makes this work a dramatic plea in defense 
of the rights .of· tbe. tation·ality which is part of the legacy of' Greek 
thought. 
Before making a glob.al balance of what the concrete life-world means 
for the realizatfon of phenomen1olo·gy as a trans.cendental logic that 
inquires into the functions of subjectivity that constitute that world~ I 
would like to point out two of its aspects~ In the first place, as Husserl 
says .in §·§ 50 and 51 of The Crisis of European Sci·ences, the concrete 
life~world is - as \\ras the surrounding world in the Ideas for a Pure 
Phenomenology- the ''starting point'' (der Ausgang), the "leading thread" 
(der Leitfaden), the ''index'' (das lndex)11 for the investigatio·ns that try 
to ''dism.a·ntle''· it, exposin.g the activities of consciousness that 11ave 
decided its objectivation. In spite of the empbas.is th.at Husserl puts 
on the description of its ide·al structures., of its. rationality~ the concrete 
life-world is not the result of bis phenomenologial inve,stigation; but only 
.a spectacle that provides the m.atei-ials to perfotm that investigation. It 
will only have reached. its end when it rev·eals the functions. of 
consciousness that constitute the objectivity of the co:ncrete life ... world. 
Th.at -is to say, w.hen it dis·covers the fundame-ntal structures o.f th.at 
world which betray the subJective activitie.s that dec.ide its presenc·e and 
its subjective validity. Those structures fo·rm the empirical network that 
appears. as the o.riginal life>Mworld in Experience and Judgment, and forms. 
the primordial world iiJ the Fifth Cartesian Meditation, In those empír-
ica! fields oper.ate the eidetic. functions that think the essential principles 
in which líes the apriorism concerning the functionS· of consciousness 
that are ne·ce.ssary and universal for ~all subje.ctive. activity - the 
objectiv.itíes of the world that condition universally and necess.arily every 
concrete state of things. Th·e original life-world is constituted by ·the 
. . 1 . ¡· d ¡·· . h 1 .. l or1gma sp,atia tty an temporai:ty t . at app y tn every te.mpora . remem-. 
brance or prevision or in every spatial Ioc.alization., as well as by the 
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individual experience of things and of the ''typic,al'' forms of their 
empirical structures. And the primordial world adds the configuration 
that decides that it belongs to a living soma, th-at of the subject that 
experiences it. But on both worlds opetates the analytical legality that 
decides their primary ontological structure, the system of formal essences 
that decide the universal structures of every object. All this tneans that 
those worlds have an intentional Iinking with the subjectivity that sets 
their objectivity; that is, with the subjectivity that operates in the living 
body t11at is proper to every subject and which marks the ·horizon of 
the experiences that form the original life-world and the primordial world 
studied in Experience and Judgment and in the Fifth Cartesian 
Meditation, respectively, and on which the intelligible objectivities valid 
a priori in every worldly state of things are constituted. 
Therefore, in spite of the richness of Husserl's analyses of the concrete 
life-world in The Crisis of European Sciences and .of bis poignancy when 
expressing 11is support for the validity of the ideals shaped by Greek 
philosophy and that constitute the te.los that has guided the history of 
Eutope for two thousand years, it is important to take into account 
that the achie·vernents of P·he11omenology are only reached when the 
reduotion has operated .on that world and has discovered the e1npirical 
configurations that fonn the original life-world and the primordial world, 
as well as tbe logical principles that rule the essential intelligible 
structures that decide their intentional constitution. 
But, in the second place, 1 wish to emphasize that the concrete life-
world is presented in The Crisis of European Sciences from a historical 
perspective which amply develops that outlined in the above-qtJoted 
passage of the Cartesian Meditations. 111 contrast to the suspicions abot1t 
history that prevailed in Philosophy a·s a Rigoro·us Science, now Ht1ss·erl 
vehemently proclaims the historicity that dominates philosophy and that 
his own phenomenology fully assumes, From the first pages of the Crisis, 
he openly declares that '4we gaze backward into the history of our present 
humanity. We can gain self-understanding, and thus inner supportt only 
by elucidating the unitary meaning which is inbom in this history" .12 And 
this is so because "we as philosophers are heirs of the past in respect 
to the goals which the word 'philosophy' indicates. in terms of concepts, 
probletns, and method.s. What is clearly necessary [ ... ] is that we reflect 
back, in a thorot1gh historical ·and critical fashion, in order to provide, 
before all decisions, for a radical self-understanding" .13 And later, 
in § 15t he insists: i'O.nly in this way can we; who not only have a 
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spiritual heritage but have become what we are thoroughly and exclu-
si vely in a historical spirin1al ma11ner, have a task wl1ich is truly our 
own''. 14 
It is cle·ar that this emphasis on the historical condition of philos-
ophy is due in great part to bis conviction that the spirit th.at gave life 
to Greek philosophy a.nd that proposed f or the first time an ideal of human 
life dominated by rationality is still alive in present day philosophy, 
His rejection of the irrationalisms that grew dreadfully in the thirties 
and of the pragmatist movements th.at raised th.e efficiency of te.ch .. 
nology to the level of an idolatry destructive of the true values of 
l1umanity, the spread of "objectivist" doctrines that made scientism a c.ult 
that impoverished the creative power of reason, all pushed Husserl to 
demand the restauration of a philosophy that would recover faith in the 
ideals of Greek thought directed towards universally valid tas.ks. 
But this ap¡Jeal to the rationality born of Greek thought could only 
play a role in Husserl's phenomenology insomuch as it became part of 
its own methodology; that is to say1 insofar as it entered somehow in 
the contents and in the tasks assigned to phenomenological investigation. 
And this co·uld only occur if the concrete life-world, as the ''starting 
point" of its investigations, recorded that historicity that included, as 
one of its fundamental ingredients, the rational heritage of Greek thought. 
In other words, just as our concrete life-world - that which belongs to 
us as men of the twentieth century - records Copernicus' heliocentrism 
or the atomic theory of modern physics, it also records the legacy of 
rationality that w·e have received from Greek philosophy and that has a 
concrete expression in Roman law, in the New Science of the 
Renaissance, and in the philosophical vocation which has been pres-ent 
in our history in many· different forms. 
Now, it is obvious that the appeal to the concrete life-world, with its 
evident historicity, introduced a new element in the phenomenological 
method,ology that, as 1 pointed out before; had omitted the problem of 
history until the year 1931 and had openly rejected. it in Philosop·hy as 
Rigorous Science. This makes us pose the problem of ap.riorism agai11. 
If it mean~ a universal and necessary validity that, therefore, should 
pre.v.ail in the whole course of history·, up to what point can. it be affected 
by the appearance of historicity in the same materials that provide the 
Hstarting point'' of phenomenology, that is, in the concrete life-world? 
Does there not exist the tisk that the apriorism becomes a nterely 
historical event, belonging to certain epochs, relative to their mentality 
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and, therefore, laoking an ab~olute validity for the whole history of 
humanity? In any case, the a priori would be reduced to the functions 
of consciousness and to the corresponding objectivities that .are the 
foundation of consciousness and to the corresponding objectivities that 
are the foundation for the constitution of the concrete life~world from 
which phenomenology starts, But would this not open up the possi-
bility that that a priori varied with history, although it continued to be 
the repertoire of ontological s·uppositions with which the ·philos·opher 
faces the alien worlds and which are valid as criteria for their compre-
hension? Then, it would be fortuitous that in each case tha.t a priori 
permitted a ttue intelection of the alíen worlds when it was congruent 
with the one prevailing in them. 
Indeed, the phe11omenologist could alway·s say, faithft1l to his 
principles, that historicaI facts - the concrete contents of history - belo11g 
to the level of contingency, that is to say, to what phen.ome11ological 
re.duction brackets and eli1ninates from its analysis, in benefit of w·hat 
is essential in any objectivity. Thus, phenomenology could maintain 
that eidetic reduction ..... the intuition of what is essential in ev·ery· object 
or ir1 every activity of consciousness, that which has a priori validity -
does not depend at all on historical vicissitudes or on the variable contents 
that any concrete life-world could show. 
How·ever, the. difficulty reappears if we consider that any phenome-
nological reduction derives from the concrete life-world th.at is proper 
to the phenomenologist who performs that reduction, since that world 
does not only offer the materials for the phenomenological an·alysis but 
is also th·e ''leading thread'' or the ''index'' for its realization. Moreover, 
phenomenology was always respectful with the material provided by 
the phenomena that make up the surrounding world or the concrete 
life-world, that is to say, the objective situations that become preser1t 
in the .natural attitude. In the Ideas for a Pure Phenomenology Husserl 
h·ad already affirmed that ''what is bracketed is not erased from the 
phenomenological chart, but simply bracketed and affected by an index. 
But, together with this, it enters the main subject of the investigation''. 15 
This ''index" can be used ·to emphasize what is essential in that which 
has been enolosed in the phenomenological b.rackets or to reduce it to 
its strict phenomenity, dispen.sing with its pretensions of being an absolute 
reality transcending the co·nsciousness that one has of it~ But, in the 
end, the concrete life-world, with its. particular historical contents, is 
retained as a "starting .Point" of the investigation or as a ''leading thread'' 
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in the search for its essential conditions. In the sec·ond of the Cartesian 
Meditations Husserl insists that ''by the universal epoche regarding the 
being or the not-being of the world, we have not simply lost the world 
.for phenomenology, we preserve it qua cogitatum't .16 That is to say~ we 
retain it as an .object fot consciousness, but with the peculiarities of its 
concrete historical contents and -- what is fundamental - as the "starting 
point" and ''leading thread'' for the phenomenological inquiries that 
depend on it. 
So, the tigour of phenomenology - which repudiates ali speculation, 
any theoretical constmction in the form of deductive inherence or any 
hyp.othesis about presumed entities that go beyond the strict phenotne.nic 
presence - had to force it to a·ffirtn that any objective structure or logical 
function that was discovered to be essential had that validity, insofar 
as it was found starting from a concrete life-world, that which is proper 
to the p.henomenologist who ca1Ti'es ot1t th.at investigation. The a priori. 
value of every essential objectivity or of every objectivizing activity 
that pretends to be universal and necessary could uphold that preten-
sion as long as it is made clear that its findings had come from the 
concrete life--world that the investigator experiences and that, strictly 
speaking, it was an a priori whose validity was only guaranteed by its 
efficiency within that concrete world and by its. ability to realize, from 
within itt the interpretation of· other worlds. 
lt must be pointed out that the a priori essences display a universal 
validity, that is· to say, a validity for every concrete life-wo.rld which 
we know of¡ The infinite divisibility of space,. for example, is not only· 
va1id for the space that extends in the world in which we, people of 
the twentieth century, live, but we also project it on to the geometrical 
conceptions of other times and it serves us as a standard to judge tl1eir 
correctness. However, an elemental phenomenological wariness should 
make us acknowledge that the validity of what we judge to be essen-
tial for sorne particular· o.bjects is brought into play by 11s from the 
concrete life~world that belo11gs to us, and th·at ·we can only extend it 
to other co11ceptions or to other worlds from the perspective provided 
by our world. that of our historical mo1nent. 
It .could a1so b·e argued that the ontological principies that are 
valid a priori in our conception of the world have been formulated in 
diff erent ways throughout the history of philosophy. It is well known, for 
example, that the principie of contradiction has 11ndergone very 
different formulations that greatly affect its sense, since the ti1nes it 
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was glimpsed by Parmenides as incompatibility between being and 
11ot-beingt tlp to tl1e analytical formulas that exclude tl1e simultaneot1s 
truth of ''p'' and ''not-p,'. But I have avoide·d that atgument because the 
apriorist could always contend that the versions that differ from the 
present one - or from the one that he considers to be correct ~ are 
erroneous arid do not at all impair the rigorous formulation of that 
logical principie. 
111 order to avoid that discussion, which could be endless an.d which 
does not get to the botto1n of the question, 1 have kept myself to 
something more elemental and decisive for a phenomenological con-
sideration: to the warning that the concrete life-world that belongs to 
t1s at present - · and that differs from other concrete lije .. worlds of other 
times or of other cultural environments bec·ause ''idealizations" very 
peculiar to its own time were embedded in it - is the ''starting point'' 
and the ''leading thread" for the phenomenological inquiries that show 
that which is essential. Therefore, the validity of the objectivities and 
logical functions that are thus credited as valid a priori will be unavoid .. 
ably linked to the concrete life-world that has favoured their beíng found .. 
Their aprioristn meaos, then, that they are the foundations of the 
constitution of the world and that they are considered necessary for that 
constitution: even more, that they are posed ''as if'' they were valid for 
every life-world logically constructed. 
This approach could be said to have a relativist flavour, since it holds 
that a phenomenology should acknowledge that the validity of what 
pretends to be a priori has to be linked to the concrete life-wot·ld that 
conditions its being found and makes the a priori be relative to the 
theoretica1 and practica! constrt1ctions that have been deposited in that 
world. But relativism is. only censurable when it contradicts itself and 
is for1nulated as disguised absolutism, that is to say, if it maintains that 
the principie of the relativity of every theory to a historical moment or 
to any perspective whatsoever has an absolute value as such principle. 
But I have not maintained this. In agree1nent with th,e as-sertion that 
evetything that appears as es-sential is linked to the historical situation 
i11 which it is asserted - to the concrete life-world from whic.h it comes 
- I must say tl1at this relativist thesis ~s valid for a pheno1nenological 
perspective belonging to our own time, since it must be acknowledged 
that phenomenology is a philosophical movement characteristic of 
tbe twentieth century and must be taken as such in order to avoid any 
t1njustified speculations and presumptions. 
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And finally, 1 wa11t to point out - insisti11g on what has been advanced 
- that the historicist interpretation of the a p1~iori that I have outlined 
does not mean its suppression in any way. On the contrary, I dare to 
s·ay that a¡1riorism is a transcendental condition of human thou·gl1t in 
any of its 1nanifestations. Every opinion, every tbesis or every known 
objectivity are constituted in agreement with objective structures or 
with logical principles that pretend to be valid a priori. That is to say, 
that pretension is necessary for every form of objectivizing conscious ... 
ness, or, using the words with which Husserl, in his Vienna Lecture of 
1935 on ''Philosophy and the Crisis of European H11manity'', refers to the 
ideals that have constituted the spiritual telos of European humanity, 
we can say that it is a ''vital presentiment'' (eine lebendige Vorahnung) 11 
that animates the p1·inciples that found every theoretical and practica} 
construction m:ade by man with pretentions of necessity. But any activity 
o·f consciousness could not be exercised or manifested unless it had tl1e 
possibility of a universal communication, and this supposes that there 
exist not only meanings that can be shared, but also so1ne essential 
ontological principies that pretend to be valid for .everyone. I would 
not speak if I did not think it possible that my opinions cot1ld, at 1east, 
be understood by those who listen to me, and 1 have an even better reason 
to 1nake use of ontological principles that, because of their 
fu·ndamentality in respect to any objective situation, have an a ¡1riori 
formulation - are valid as if they were universal and necessary. Quite 
a different matter is tl1at this pretension is confirrned by the facts or by 
the contigencies of human communication. And it would not be tl1e 
first time that the difficulties to achieve the complete fulfilment of certain 
principles have forced their correction. 
But from the point of view of a phe1101nenological argumentation, what 
1 wish to emphasize is that this "presentiment" of the a priori validity 
of the ontological principles that mark the necessary and universal 
conditions of th.ot1ght and of its intersubjective understanding is not 
trivial, although it is restricted by its link to the concrete life-world that 
belongs to it. It is a validity in respect to principles whose formulation 
and contents must be considered as relative to a concrete moment in 
history. This means that it is a validity that can be 1nodified if the general 
coordination of those principies and their efficacy to account for new 
situations or experiences demand it .. However, we nece·ssarily resort to 
those principles as if their a· p.rio·ri validity were tnost fir1nly guara11-
teed. Thus this a priori validity of the ontological principles that mark 
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the funda1nental conditions of the concrete life-world is a "presentiment" 
that cannot be rejected, since it necessarily promotes its use. Moreover, 
that apriorism is an unavoidable condition in order to establish dialogue 
with other people, with other cultures, as if their behaviour and their 
language were governed by the same a priori. Only the practice of 
dialogue or the interp1·etation of the theoretical or practica! behaviour 
of oth,er people will dlscover th:e li1nits of that a priori, its shortcom~ 
ings and the pos.sibility of its substitution by another a priori. It could 
be said that every a priori is provisional but that, in s.pite of that 
temporary character; a theoretical or practical behaviour cannot fu11ction 
without the ''presentiment'' that its principies are universally and 
necessarily valid. And "the fusion of worldly horizons'' -using Gadamer's 
words - is only possible when there are systems of principies operating 
in different wo.rlds that pretend to have an a priori v·alidity in all of 
them in spite of their worldly diversity. Their congruence permits 
- from the perspective of each one of those systems and. from the 
corresponding concrete life .. worlds - a plausible translatability of the 
situatio·ns existing in the others, although sometimes this also reveals 
the diff eren ces that make them to be different worlds that ha ve been 
constitt1ted by historical vicis.situ,des on systems of di vergent princi-
pies . 
University of Valencia 
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